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DISCOURSE 



THE COVENANT WITH JUDAS 



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By JOHN PJERPONT. 




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A DISCOURSE 



THE COVENANT WITH JUDAS, 



PREACHED IN 



HOLLIS-STREET CHURCH, NOV. 6, 1842. 



By JOHN PIERPONT. 




BOSTON: 

CHARLES C. LITTLE AND JAMES BROWN. 
1842. 






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NOTE. 

That part of this Discourse, which was preached in the 

morning, was fully written out ; and is printed as it was delivered. 

The part, preached in the afternoon, was delivered chiefly from 

notes ; and though, in preparing it for the press, I have followed, 

as closely as I could, the train of thought and argument, I pretend 

not to give the language as spoken. 

J. P. 



- 



DISCOURSE. 



Matthew xxvi. 15. 
They covenanted with him for thirty pieces of silver. 

It is not my object, in the present discourse, to treat of, or 
attempt to measure, the guilt of that unworthy disciple of the 
Lord Jesus, whose covenant to betray Ms Master, as well as the 
consideration of that covenant, is stated in these words. Nor 
yet do I propose to inquire what could have been the motive of 
a disciple who, like Judas, had had a more than ordinary trust 
reposed in him by his Master and his feUow disciples, to prove 
false to that trust, and deliver him by whom he had been treated 
with such confidence, into the hands of those who were seeking his 
life. But I take, rather, this statement of a particular covenant, to 
do an act of acknowledged baseness and iniquity, as an occasion of 
considering the general question of the binding force or obliga- 
tion of all agreements, contracts, promises, vows or oaths, to do 
that which is a violation of natural right, and which, were there 
no such solemn engagement, would be acknowledged to be 
wrong. 

This subject appears to me to be especially pertinent to the 
present occasion, when, at the Communion table, we are called 
to commemorate the death of one man, who was given up, or 
betrayed to those who were hunting after his life, bv virtue of a 



\ » 



covenant that he should be thus betrayed ; and when, at the same 
time, our city is moved by the spectacle of another man, that is 
to be give'n up or betrayed to perpetual and hopeless bondage, if 
not to a cruel death, by virtue of a covenant that he shall be thus 
betrayed. 

The essential morality of these two covenants is the same. 
The one was a covenant to give up an innocent man to death, in 
consideration of thirty pieces of silver. The other is a covenant 
to give up an innocent man to a bondage worse than death, in 
consideration of certain real or supposed political advantages, 
from which the covenanting parties expect to make more than 
thirty pieces of silver. Thus we see that, although there may be 
some difference in the consideration of the two covenants, by 
which, in one case the life, and, in the other the liberty of a 
man is to be sacrificed, the essential morality in both cases is < 

precisely the same : both of them being to do an act which is 
a violation of a natural right ; in the one case the natural right of 
a man to his life ; and in the other, Iris natural right to his liberty. 
And, as every violation of a right is a wrong, a sin, a transgres- 
sion of the moral law of God, each of these covenants comes, 
alike, under the cognizance of the Christian teacher, whose 
province it is to lift up his voice against wrong — ' to show his 
people their sins,' as a means of effecting the great work for 
which God, having raised up Ins son Jesus, sent him to bless us, by 
by turning every one of us away from his iniquities. And I deem 
such a subject of discourse, — useful as it must be at all times, — 
especially seasonable, at a time when the consequences of a \ 

covenant to do a wrong are brought so forcibly and so formidably 
before us as they are in the case already alluded to ; — and I 
deem no day too holy — no Christian rites too . sacred — to have 
this great question of Christian — nay, of universal — morality, 
thought of and spoken of, in connexion with it' 



This morning, then, I propose to take up and consider the 
general question of the obligation, or binding force, in the forum 
of conscience, and at the bar of God, of all covenants, engage- 
ments, compacts, vows, promises or oaths, to do that, which, 
without such oath, promise or covenant, is confessedly wrong : — 
and, in the afternoon I propose to apply the general principle at 
which we may arrive, to several cases of oaths or covenants of 
this kind, winch occur in the sacred history ; and especially to 
the case now occurring in this community, of a fugitive slave, 
now in a Massachusetts prison, by order or direction of a citizen 
of Virginia, who claims him as his property. 

The idea seems to have prevailed, in all nations, and ages that 
vows, or promises made with the solemnity of a direct invocation 
of the name of the Supreme Power, and under the penal sanc- 
tions of religion, impose an extraordinary obligation ; and the 
opinion has been widely extended that such vows cannot, under 
any circumstances, be broken, without incurring guilt, of peculiar 
enormity, and deserving a corresponding severity of punishment. 

To the diligent reader of the sacred volume, especially, cases 
of vows will occur, which seem to have involved the parties 
making them in great embarrassment, and to have been, to them 
or to others, the occasion of guilt or suffering, which way soever 
the person making them might turn himself. The vow of Jephtha, 
that he would offer, as a burnt offering unto the Lord, whatso- 
ever should come forth from the doors of his house to meet him, 
returning in peace from the slaughter of the children of Am- 
nion ;* — that of the Jews residing in 'Egypt in the days of Jere- 
miah, that they would burn incense to the queen of heaven and 
pour out drink offerings unto her ;t — that of Herod, who prom- 
ised with an oath, to the daughter of Herodias, that he would 
give her whatsoever she should ask, even to the half of his 

* Judges xi. 30, 31. t Jeremiah xliv. 17, 25. 



8 

kingdom;* — that of the Jews, who bound thomsfilves with an 
Dath, that they would neither eat nor drink till they had slain 
Paul ;t — and the promise or covenant of Judas, that he would 
betray his Master to those who were thirsting for his blood,$ — 
all prove to us that oaths, or solemn obligations, to do that which 
is either of questionable right, or of unquestionable wrong, 
are not things of recent origin : — and when the same diligent 
reader of the sacred oracles finds, among those oracles, language 
like the following, — ' If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or 
swear an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break 
his word ; he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his 
mouth' § — 'Thou shalt perform unto the Lord thy vows 'II — 
' He shall dwell on thy holy hill ' — ' who sweareth to his own 
hurt and changeth not'H — it is not very wonderful, that questions, 
relating to the binding force of such vows, should be regarded as 
those that are attended with difficulty, or as those that are worthy 
of serious consideration, and of public discussion by such as 
come up into the house of God with an earnest desire to know 
what is his will, and how they may practically conform them- 
selves to it. 

Of all the various forms of engagement which I have named, 
an oath is probably regarded as the most solemn and binding. 
Let us first see, then, what is the obligation of an oath to do 
wrong : for if that is not binding, it will probably be admitted 
that no other engagement can be. 

An oath, or a vow, may be defined to be a promise, made with 
the solemnities and sanctions of religion, to do, or not to do a specific 
thing. 

The question is, What obligation is created, and imposed by 
such a promise ? This question, it is obvious, cannot be an- 
swered without first asking, what are the obligations under 

* Matthew xiv. 8. t Acts xxiii. 12, 14, 21. % Matt. xxvi. 15. 

§ Numbers xxx. 2. II Matthew v. 33. 1 Psalms xv. 1. 4. 



9 

which the promising party previously lay, to do, or not to do 
the thing that he lias sworn : and, in as much as our obligations, 
or duties, result altogether from the relations in which we 
stand to other beings, some of which relations We voluntarily 
take upon ourselves, and others arc cast upon us without bur act, 
or the consent of our own will, there is, in every case of this 
nature, a question still antecedent to that of our duties or obli- 
gations — viz : What are the relations in which we stand to other 
beings ? Now all those relations that arc cast upon us, or in 
which we find ourselves placed without our own act or choice, 
bring with themselves their specific duties, which we may no 
more refuse to perform, than we may refuse to stand in the rela- 
tions, out of which they grow. The filial relation, or the relation 
of a child to a parent, is of this class : so also the fraternal rela- 
tion, or the relation of brother and sister, in the family. It does 
not depend upon my will, act or choice, whether I will be the 
child of my parents, or the brother of their other children. I 
may not say, I am their child, or their brother no longer : and, as 
I cannot withdraw myself from either of these relations, I can- 
not withdraw myself, without guilt, from those duties which God 
has inseparably connected with them. By the high ordinances 
of the Most High, I am bound to these, his creatures, by a chain 
which I cannot break and cannot tlnow off. By this chain I am 
bound to show obedience to my parents, in my childhood, in 
respect to every command wliich they have a right to give me, 
a in I to show them reverence and an affectionate deference, so 
long as they live. 

Now, what if I make a vow unto the Lord, that I ici/l thus 
Ileal my parents? Cs any new obligation created, any addition- 
al forc< given to the pre-existing obligation thai was upon me 
to obe) or revere my parents ? Most obviously not. Th< com- 
mand of God, that I should honor my father and my mother, 



10 

was anterior to my vow that I would honor them. The precept, 
' Children, obey your parents/ was anterior, and the reason of that 
precept, ' for this is right,' has existed, as long as the relation of 
parent and child has existed among the creatures of God. No 
new weight is given to the obligation by my vow ; for it was upon 
me before, with all the weight that Divine authority could give 
it ; and its weight, therefore, cannot be enhanced. If, indeed, I 
distrust my own resolutions to discharge my duties to my parents, 
or if I have been so inconsiderate, or so thankless, as to make 
no such resolutions, I may, perhaps, in the secrecy of my own 
mind, or under the solemnities of a public oath, promise that I 
will hereafter perform the duties that I have heretofore neglected. 
But, in such a case, my vow creates no new obligation. I may 
use it, as I may use any other means of virtue, — the example, 
or the exhortations, or the rebukes of others, or the suggestions 
of my own conscience, or a fearful looking for of judgement, — to 
break in upon my habitual thoughtlessness, or to give strength to 
my weak resolutions, and to help me thus to do what, without 
my vow, I ought to have done ; and what, shonld I continue to 
neglect it, I shall suffer for not doing. It is upon this ground 
that, as members of a Christian church, we covenant with each 
other that, at certain times, or under certain circumstances, we 
will unite in commemorating the love, life and death of our 
Saviour, Jesus Christ, in the rite of ' the Lord's supper.' Our 
obligation to cherish a reverent and grateful remembrance of Him 
who has given us an immortal hope, and is calling us to glory in 
calling us to virtue, is not created — is not, in the least, affected 
by this our covenant. That obligation is contemporaneous with 
our relation to Jesus as his disciples. It grows out of that 
relation, and must last as long as the relation itself lasts. 
By our covenant we may strengthen our purposes of meeting 
this obligation, and, so far as it can ever be discharged, of 



11 

discharging it. And that may be a good reason for onr entering 
into the church covenant. It may help us meet an old obliga- 
tion, but it creates no new one. The Temperance Fledge 
stands upon precisely the same ground. It lays me under no 
new obligation, though it may help me to discharge an old 
one ; for the obligation to ' live soberly, in the present evil world,' 
has lain upon me, from the first, and will do so to the last day of 
my life. I did not voluntarily assume the obligation. It was 
cast upon me by the Maker of my frame, and I cannot cast it 
off Experience shows that the pledge, which is of the nature 
of a vow, or oath, has, in multitudes of cases, been one, among 
the means of redeeming the poor slave of an evil habit from his 
thraldom ; and if he breaks it after having taken it, he adds sin 
to sin, and thus doubly wrongs his own soul ; but, neither by 
subscribing a pledge does he bind himself to be temperate, nor 
by erasing his name, does he loose himself from the cords with 
which the hand of God has bound him. My vow, in short, may 
help my virtue, but does not- strengthen, or in the least degree 
affect, my obligation. 

There is another class of relations, which are voluntarily 
assumed or entered into, and which, under certain circumstances, 
may be assumed or declined, according to the choice or pleasure 
of the individual. The conjugal relation is of this kind. As a 
general rule, it is a duty, at a proper season, to enter hito this 
relation. But there are many exceptions to this general rule. 
The case of Paul, not to press the higher one of Iris Master, 
was of this character ; and there arc, in all ages and countries, 
other cases, in which a person is free to marry or not to many, 
according to his convictions of duty or propriety, the circumstan- 
ces of his particular case being duly considered ; in other words, 
in which he may innocently marry or not, as he shall choose. 
But, having once determined to marry, and having entered into 



12 

the conjugal relation, he is not free to choose whether he will 
discharge or neglect the duties of that relation. He is then 
bound; — bound, not by his inarriage vows, or by any vow after 
his marriage, but bound by the very nature of the relation into 
which he has chosen to enter. Having put on the relation of 
husband, he cannot, at his pleasure, put on or put off the obliga- 
tions which belong to the character, that he has assumed. So 
long as he stands in that relation, he is a debtor to it, and must 
perform his relative duties as faithfully, and by refusing to per- 
form them he incurs as deep a stain of guilt, as if the relation 
had been cast upon him by the act of God, without his own 
co-operation or consent. 

So, too, from the moment that one stands in the relation 
of parent, although, to a certain extent, that relation may have 
been voluntarily assumed, the person standing in it is under 
bonds which can be neither strengthened nor weakened by any 
vow, to meet the claims of duty that are urged upon the parent's 
heart, by the voice of the child, and by the voice of conscience, 
and of God, that comes with the child, to ensure for its helpless- 
ness defence, and instruction for it in its ignorance. And, to all 
the other creatures of God, that fall within the compass of our 
influence or regards, we hold certain specific relations, every one 
of which has duties or obligations connected with it, varying in 
then nature so as to correspond, in every instance, with the rela- 
tion from which they spring, and alike above and beyond the 
control of him who is bound by them : — a truth intimated by the 
force of the veiy language used in treating of oligations : — for 
is it not absurd to say of a man that he is hound, by a cord that 
he can tie or untie at his pleasure ? 

To the Author of our being we are all related, as his creatures, 
his children, his subjects, his dependants. These various rela- 
tions, existing from the first, and enduring to the last moment that 



* 



13 

we exist, are the source of obligations equally enduring; and as 

these relations are cast upon us absolutely, without our own 
co-operation or choice, so the duties or obligations thai result 
from them are absolute and beyond our control. To our constant. 
Benefactor we owe gratitude for the past and trust for the time 
to come: — to our Supreme Ruler, allegiance which cannot be 
withheld without sin. And these, our obligations to be thankful 
and obedient, we cannot strengthen — we can give them no new 
force — by any vow, that we arill thank and obey him. His own 
irrefragable bonds arc upon us, from the first moment that we 
knew him, and were acquainted with the relations in which we 
stand to him, and in which he stands to us; and we can make 
those bonds no stronger by any labors of our own, though we lift 
up our weak hands, in oaths or imprecations, at the horns of his 
altar, or at the footstool of his throne. Here, indeed, as in cases 
already stated, we may seek help for the infirmity of our own pur- 
poses of obedience, in vows or oaths that we will obey ; we may 
awaken our dormant gratitude, by solemn engagements in his 
presence that we will, in all things, render him the thanks that 
are due for his benefits, and the obedience due to him as our 
Sovereign, for the wisdom and perfectness of his laws. But, 
by these our vows, we affect not our obligations. We assume, 
no new ones, and we discharge no old ones. True, we may 
perform our vows ; and, when we vow unto the Lord, we should 
perform our vows : but, in no such case does the vow give to 
God a new claim upon our hearts or our efforts, nor docs it lay 
us under any new obligation. Those claims grow out of God's 
benefits, and are as constant as the blessings from which they 
spring. Those obligations already exist, and arc as strong as is 
the right hand that is stretched out to uphold us. 

We are, moreover, in a strictly literal sense, related to our- 
selves; in as much as our own moral conduct, in all its bearings 



— K 



14 

and consequences, is, by the unchanging principles of our own 
constitution, and of God's moral government, brought back, or 
re-fated to ourselves. Our moral condition, or the state of our 
moral feelings, has constant reference, or relation to our moral 
acts, so far as we have, ourselves, been the subjects of them. 
In perfect harmony with this constitution of our nature, the 
Great Being who thus constituted it, having a desire to the work 
of his hand, and a regard for its well being, has given us com- 
mands, or laid us under obligations, to do nothing to ourselves by 
which our own well being shall be endangered or destroyed. By 
his ordinances he has hedged us in, upon the right and left, that 
we stray not from our own peace. He has laid us under obliga- 
tion, — and that without consulting us, or asking our consent 

to live soberly, temperately, purely, regarding ourselves as the 
servants of God, who are bound to minister to him with clean 
hands ; or as temples of God, which ought always to stand before 
him ' in the beauty of holiness.' Now, our obligations to be thus 
holy are not of our assuming. They are laid upon us by our 
Maker's hand, in all the weight which he sees necessary to the 
well balancing, and to the setting in motion, of the exquisite 
moral machinery by which the good of his creatures is wrought 
out. Our promises that we will meet and discharge these obliga- 
tions give them no new weight, with whatever solemnities those 
promises are made. No vow can draw closer the cords by which 
we are bound. An Almighty hand has adjusted these, and put 
them out of the reach of all other hands, as entirely as he has, 
the cords that hold the planets in their place, as they whirl in 
their everlasting orbits. We can add nothing to their strength, — 
nothing to their Scicredness, — nothing to their duration. 

Can we break them, then, by our word ! Can we shake them 
oif by our oath that we tcitt shake them off! Can we cast off 
the cords of the Almighty merely by swearing that we will no 



15 

longer follow his guidance ? — If we must answer these questions 
in the negative, — andean it be doubted that we must.' — aie 
we not furnished with a ready and conclusive answer to the 
question, What is the binding force, or obligation, of those vows 
or oaths, by winch men, in all ages, have sought to bind them- 
selves, to a violation or breach of the laws of God? — The 
government of God is not one which we have ordained, each for 
himself, and winch, therefore, each for himself can annul or throw 
off at his pleasure. We are not free to choose whether we will 
come under, or remain under his laws, or not. As we did not 
enact, we cannot repeal them ; as we did not ordain, we cannot 
annul them. By his law we are bound to tell the truth, before 
we can bind ourselves by an oath that we will tell a falsehood. 
The hand of the Most High had laid us under an obligation, 
attended by fearful sanctions, to do our brother good, long before 
we thought of bmding ourselves, under penalty of a great curse, 
to do him evil. His obligations, then, are prior and paramount 
to those under which we may seek to lay ourselves, in opposition 
to them; — unless, indeed, we are ready to take the ground that 
our authority over God's laws is higher than his own. To what 
an absurdity, indeed, should we be reduced, — to say nothing of 
the tremendous anarchy, — by admitting the doctrine that a man 
is excusable in breaking a law of God, — nay, that he ought to 
break it, because he has bound himself by an oath that he will 
break it ! — that he may, or must, refuse to obey a commandment 
of the Most High, if once the oath of the Most High is upon 
him that he will not obey it! The whole code of the divine 
laws might thus be easily repealed, as to their bearing, and their 
binding force, upon any individual ; and he might innocently break 
them all, merely because he had impiously sworn that he would 
break them all ! 

By the course of our reasoning, from the ground assumed, as 



16 

well as by the reduction to an absurdity which comes from assum- 
ing an opposite ground, we are brought to this conclusion : — that 
all engagements, promises, covenants, vows or oaths to do a thing 
which is contrary to any one of the laws of God, or not to do a thing 
which any one of his laws requires, are utterly null, and void of 
binding force : — that a vow, even, to do what the law of God 
requires, creates no new obligation ; and therefore, for a stronger 
reason, an oath not to do what it requires, or to do what it forbids, 
annuls no obligation that existed before : — that a man, so far from 
being justified or excused in doing -wrong, by an oath which he has 
taken, that he will do wrong, is involved, by that oath in still deeper 
guilt, since, by that very oath, he gives evidence of acting delibe- 
rately and with premeditation, and adds to the sin of violating 
God's law, the effrontery of swearing, in the presence of God, that 
he will violate it. He commits one sin in taking the oath, and 
another and still a greater sin in keeping it. And this I there- 
fore venture to lay down as a general — nay, as a universal princi- 
ple ; that no vow or oath, to do that which is forbidden by any 
law of God, or not to do that which is required, is of any binding 
force, or imposes any obligation whatever; let the solemnities of 
the oath be as awful, and let the penalties imprecated with it, at 
the hand of cither man or God, be as severe or as fearful as they 
may. 



Before proceeding, as I proposed, to apply this great principle 
of morality to the several cases which occur in the sacred 
writings, and in the ordinary course of affairs at the present day, 
of vows oaths or covenants to do that which, without such 
engagement would be confessedly wrong; I must advert to a 
few passages in the Scriptures, which, at first view, seem to 
inculcate the doctrine that all vows are obligatory, at all events. 



17 

To the questions, ' Who shall abide in thy tabernacle ? "Who 
shall dwell in thy holy hill?' the psalmist replies, — among 
others, ' lie that sweareth to his own hurt, and changeth not.'* 
This is well; nor does it conlliet with the general principle. 
already established. To swear to one's own hurt docs not even 
imply that he sweareth in his own wrong. Where there is a 
good consideration (or a promise, covenant, or oath, or even where 
there is not a corrupt or bad consideration, a man is bound by his 
oath, or other engagement, even though it be to his own hurt; — 
to his loss of personal ease or comfort, his loss of fortune, friends, 
or the estimation of those whose good opinion he most values. 
Nay, he may give his body to be burned, rather than prove false 
to his oath of allegiance to his earthly sovereign, or to his Lord 
and Saviour Jesus Christ. 

' He fears to change the thing lie swears, 
Whatever pain or loss he bears.' 

But he may not even take an oath, and, for a stronger reason, he 
may not perform one, that is itself an act, or that binds him to do 
an act, in derogation of his fealty to God. 

Again, it is said,! ' If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or 
swear an oath, to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break 
his word : he shall do all that proceedeth out of his mouth.' But 
there is no reason to suppose that the oath, here intended, is to 
do an act, in itself wrong. Indeed, the contrary is implied ; for 
the oath in supposition is one unto the Lord, and not one against 
him. Besides, Moses, in immediate connexion with the text 
just cited, goes on to provide, in the case of oaths taken by wo- 
men, that if the woman be unmarried and living in her father's 
house, if the father disapprove the oath, it is null and void ; as it 
is, also, if the woman be married, and her oath be disapproved by 
her husband. Li each of these cases, ' not any of her vows, or 

* Psalms xv. 4. t Numbers xxx. 2. 

3 



18 

of her bonds, wherewith she hath bound her soul, shall stand. 7 
The Lord shall forgive her, because her father or her husband 
disallowed her. Can we doubt that God, the universal Father, 
will annul a vow that he disapproves of, when he gives a human 
father authority to annul a vow of which he disapproves ? 

Let us now look at some of the cases, that occur in the sacred 
histoiy, of vows to do a wrong, by violating a natural right. 

1. The case of Jephtha* is of this kind ; — the case brought so 
near to the hearts of many of my hearers by the touching song, 
'Jephtha's Daughter.' Supposing you, my friends, to be ac- 
quainted with the fact, in this case, I ask you, whether it is 
possible that the father's vow imposed upon him the slightest 
obligation, to oiler his daughter as a burnt offering unto the Lord. 
These two considerations are enough to satisfy us all that it 
did not, and that it could not. First, it is a principle of construc- 
tion, in all compacts, vows, or promises, that they must be con- 
strued, and if they bind, at all, that they are binding, in the sense 
in which the party making them intends that they should be, and 
supposes that they are, understood by the other party. Now, if 
the father, in this case, had not the daughter in his mind, when he 
made the vow, he must have known that the other party, who, 
in this case, was the ' Searcher of hearts,' could not have under- 
stood him to have his daughter in liis mind : — in other words, 
must have known that he never vowed to sacrifice his daughter. 
Of course he was under no obligation to do it. And, secondly, 
even had Jephtha, — who lived in the darkest age of Israel's 
history, and who, though he may have been a good fighter, was 
yet an illegitimate child, and, as such, was, from his boyhood, 
made an outcast from his father's house, and got what moral 
education he had, in a gang of banditti, — been so little imbued 
with moral science, as to have embraced his daughter in the 

* Judges xi. 



19 

scope of his vow, we know that his offering could not. have 
been accepted of God; first, because no sacrifice could be offered 
except by the priest, and thai, too, where the ark of the Lord 
'was; and, secondly, because, by the laws of Moses, no human 
sacrifice was allowed on any terms. — (Note 1.) 

2. The oath of Herod * that he would give to the daughter of 
Herodias whatsoever she should ask, is like the vow of Jcphlha, 
and was void for the same reasons. It could not be legitimately 
construed into a promise to do an act in itself wrong. The king 
could not have had the head of John the Baptist in his mind, 
when he made the promise, nor yet did the party to whom the 
promise was made so understand him. Nor, even if he had 
meant that particular gift, and had supposed that he was so 
understood, would he have laid himself under any obligation to 
commit the murder, that was asked at his hands. 

3. The oath by which more than forty Jews bound — or sou -lit 
to bind — themselves, that they would neither eat nor drink till 
they had killed Paul,f is of a different character, in this point, 
namely, that the contracting parties did understand themselves 
perfectly, and understood that the act in view was a wrong — a 
violation of a man's natural, inalienable right to his life. This 
compact was void, for two reasons. First, because it was to 
violate a natural right; and, secondly, because it was, "what in 
law is termed a nudum pactum — a hare promise, without any 
consideration. 'A consideration, of some sort or other,' Bays Sir 
William Blackstone,t 'is so absolutely necessary to the forming 
of a contmrt thai a nudum pactum, oi an agreement to do or pay 
any thing on one side, without any compensation on the other, 
is totally void inlaw and a man cannot be compelled to perform it .' 

4. The case brought under our notice in the text, the covenant 
between the chief priests, as one parly, ami Judas [scariol as the 

* Matthew xiv. 0— li f Acts xziii. 21 % Comraenlari U ll"> 



20 

other, differs in this point from all those already considered; 
namely, — it was not understood by either party as a religions 
act. like that of Jephtha ; nor was it exactly an oath, like that of 
Herod, or like that of the Jews conspiring to kill Paul ; nor, like 
this last, was it without consideration ; — for here, the considera- 
tion paid and received was, ' thirty pieces of silver.' But does a 
difference in this point make a difference in the moral character 
of the act covenanted for ? We have seen that a covenant or 
promise, with no consideration, is void. Does a consideration, 
worse than none, make it other than void ? ' The civilians hold,' 
says the great commentator upon English law, already quoted, 
' that in all contracts, either express or implied, there must be 
something given in exchange, something that is mutual and re- 
ciprocal. This thing, which is the price or motive of the con- 
tract, we call the consideration : and it must be a thing lawful in 
itself, or else the contract is void.'* In fact, no principle in law is 
better established than this, that a corrupt or immoral considera- 
tion so thoroughly vitiates a contract or covenant, that, as between 
the parties themselves, it can never be purged. And this is law 
all over the world. If, in the streets of Borne or Naples, I hire 
an assassin to do his work, on credit, I am under no obligation to 
pay him when it is done. If I pay him in advance, he is under 
no obligation to do the work. No solemnity of form, no amount 
of consideration, can sanctify the compact, or make it binding 
upon the soul of either party. Indeed, so universally is this truth 
admitted, that it has passed into a proverb, that ' a bad promise is 
better broke than kept' 

If need were, the high authority of our Great Master might 
be appealed to, in support of the position which has been taken, 
and which I am endeavoring to defend in this discourse. The 
Saviour does not indeed mention any specific instance of a vow, 

* Blackstone's Commentaries, II. 444, 



21 

sinful in itself, and therefore void. But he takes notice of, and 
pointedly condemns a practice, at the bottom of which lay the 
same corrupt popular sentiment, which, even in our own day, has 
done so much to give a practical validity to vows and covenants, 
in themselves immoral. This was, the practice, on the part of 
children, of devoting to God, as a religious offering, what they 
ought to apply to the support of their aged and helpless parents ; 
thus, by their tradition, making of none effect the commands of 
God, ' Honor thy father and mother,' and ' Whoso curseth father 
or mother, let him die the death.' — (Note 2.) 

This is ' making thorough work.' It is going to the bottom of 
the whole matter. For, if I may not bind myself, by a vow, to 
give up even to God, i. e. if I may not, without sin, devote to 
pious uses, that which is my own, when, in so doing, I withhold 
from another, that to which he has a natural right ; much less can 
I, without sin, bind myself, by a covenant, vow or oath, to <nve 
up, to impious uses, that which is not my own. And, if I cannot 
bind myself to do this, by my own covenant or oath, a fortiori 
another cannot bind me to do it, by covenanting for me that I 
shall. 

This brings us directly upon the case that is now regarded 
with such intense interest in this community. 

A man — a creature of God, made in his image, — a child of 
God, as much as any one of us is — who was a slave in Virginia, 
and, by the laws of that State, held to be a chattel — a thing — has 
been brought out of his house of bondage, and stands here, upon 
Massachusetts ground, and breathes Massachusetts air, in sight 
of the monument that stands on Bunker's Hill, to toll where 
Massachusetts men poured out their life-blood in the cause of 
Liberty. He is pursued by a man. who calls himself Ins mener 
He is hunted down by slavery's minions in Boston ; is seized 



22 

and cast into a Boston jail ; where, by direction of the Virginian, 
not even the ministers of Jesus Christ are allowed to ' come unto 
him ;' though, in the humane spirit- — nay, by the letter — of Mas- 
sachusetts law, they are allowed to visit a prisoner, whose hands 
are reeking with his brother's blood. His pursuer demands that 
he be given up. Will he be ? I suppose, he will. On what 
ground? By virtue of a covenant, which, it is said, our fathers 
made with the Virginian's fathers, that, in such cases, the fugi- 
tive should be given up. 

Here, then, two inquiries present themselves : 

First, Is it so ? 

Secondly, What if it is so? 

First, Is it so ? I place myself, by supposition, upon the judge- 
ment-seat, with a religious sense of my responsibleness to God 
and to man, for the present and all future ages, for time and eter- 
nity : and I ask, Is this so ? In reply, I say, — If it is so, it can be 
proved to be so, by inspection of the covenant itself. Let me 
look at it. I am told that it is found in the third clause of the 
second section of the fourth Article of the Constitution of the 
United States. I look at the clause, and find that it provides for 
the surrender of 'persons held to service or labor in one State, under 
the laws thereof, escaping into another ;' but this is, by no means, 
conclusive against a man in the position of the party before me. 
Nay, so far as the letter of the covenant is concerned, it does not 
raise even a presumption against him. That clause contains a 
description, which embraces persons or classes totally distinct 
from slaves ; a description, moreover, which, in some of its points, 
is utterly inapplicable to a slave. It provides for the case of a 
minor, who escapes from the control and service of his parent; — 
for that of an apprentice, who escapes from the service due to 
his master, in consideration of the instruction that his master 
gives him, in the art or mystery of which he is an apprentice ; — 



23 

for that of an emigrant from abroad, who is held, by his own 
contract, to repay, by his service or labor, the money advanced 
by another for his conveyance to our shores; — nay, even for the 
case of a minister of the gospel, who is held, personally, to the 
service of his people, by his own contract ; but who deserts his 
flock, and withdraws into another State, leaving his sheep to the 
wolves. All these persons are fugitives from justice, — from the 
demands of natural right, and, therefore, of the moral law ; — 
whereas, the man before me is a fugitive from injustice. Justice 
has no claims upon him. And, as this clause of the Constitution 
immediately follows a clause, which provides for the surrender of 
other fugitives from justice — offenders, that is, against criminal 
law — I conclude that the intention of the framers of the Consti- 
tution was, to provide, in the one clause, for graver, and, in the 
other, for minor offences against natural law. 

I then look still further ; and, though I see that the framers of 
the Constitution have carefully abstained from laying the word 
slave upon the face of that instrument, they have, in another part 
of it,* enumerated several other classes of persons, among which 
are, ' free persons, including those hound to service for a term of 
years :' — a description, so nearly identical with that in the clause, 
relied upon in the present case, that, if I construe one part of the 
instrument by another, as, by the laws of construction, I am bound 
to do, I have good reason to believe that they meant the same 
sort of persons, in the one case as in the other. And this infer- 
ence's fortified by the fact that, in the clause last cited, by com- 
mon admission, and by practice under the Constitution ever since 
its adoption, slaves are brought in under the phrase ' other per- 
sons.' Slaves, then, in the language of the Constitution, are 
' other persons ' than such as are described, in one place, as 
' persons bound to service for a term of years,' and, in the other, 

* Article I. Section 2, *[3. 



24 

as ' persons held to service or labor.' If, then, slaves are other 
persons than these, they are not these persons. 

This construction is favored — nay, it is demonstrably enforced, 
by the closing words of the clause appealed to, which provides that 
the persons therein described ' shall be delivered up, on claim of 
the party to whom such service or labor may be due! Now, all 
duties or dues result, as has been shown, from the natural rela- 
tions ; those in which, according to the laws and ordinances of 
God, men stand to each other. But the relation of owner and 
slave is not a natural relation. No duty, then, can result from it. 
Nothing can be due from a slave to his holder. I ask the party 
making this claim, by what law, the service of the party claimed 
is due to him ? Does he say, ' By the laws of Virginia ' ? I 
reply, Those laws are of no force in Massachusetts. Does he 
say, ' By the laws of the United States ' ? I answer, Show me 
the law, declaring that the service or labor of the slave is due to 
his owner. — (Note 3.) Does he say, ' By the Constitution of the 
United States ' ? I answer, You beg the question. Does he say, 
' By the law of nature ' ? I answer, By that law your service 
and labor, or your money, is due to him, in consideration of his 
liberty, which you have wrongfully taken from him, and of the 
labor and services, which you have wrung from him, for years, 
and the wages for which ' is, of you, kept back by fraud.' If, 
therefore, you appeal to the law of nature, you will find that, 
instead of that man's service and labor being due to you, yours 
are due to him. 

And, once more : I look at the Preamble of the Constitution, 
the part, that is, which declares its object, its final cause, the 
purpose for which it was framed. Among other objects, is this — 
' to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.' 
Now, not only am I bound, as a minister of justice, in all cases 
of doubtful meaning, to give the language of the law such a con- 



25 

struction as shall favor natural right ; and in all cases, where the 
life or liberty of a man is in question, to give it such a construction 
as shall favor life and liberty ; for both which reasons, I must 
construe the clause, here hi question, hi favor of the freedom of 
the party claimed ; but I am also bound, to give to every legal 
instrument such a construction as to make all the parts of it 
harmonious; so as to give "validity to the whole instrument; ut 
res rnagis valeat quam per eat ; and not so to construe one part of 
it as to make it destroy another. But, if I construe the clause in 
question so as to give this claimant Ins demand, I give it a con- 
struction which is in direct conflict with the Preamble. I make 
the means defeat the end ; and, instead of making the Constitu- 
tion, which I have sworn to support, a means of securing the 
' blessings of hberty ' to the people of the United States, I make 
it the means of securing the curse of slavery to one-sixth part of 
those people, and the concomitant curses of it to all the rest 
If, then, I give this clause the construction that shall deliver up 
one of the men before me, as the slave of the other, I violate a 
fundamental law, observed in the construction of all laws; I 
make the laws of man paramount to the laws of God, in that I 
construe this instrument against natural right ; and, at the same 
time, I put one part of it, which provides the means, in direct 
antagonism with another, which sets forth the end, proposed to 
be effected by the instrument itself. Judgement must, therefore, 
be against the man who claims the other as Ids slave, under this 
instrument, unless he can show, aliunde, that it was the intention 
of the framers of it to uphold slavery by the veiy document, 
which, they declare, they are framing as a security to freedom ; 
in other words, that, on one page, they go about to break down, 
what, on another, they declare that they have set about building 
up. 

Can this be shown ? There is a strong antecedent probability 
4 



26 

against it. The evidence to sustain such a position, therefore, 
must be proportionally clear and strong. It may be sought for, 
and it may be found, in the reports that have come down to us of 
the dehberations, debates, and other doings of the Convention 
that framed the Constitution of the United States. I know not 
that it is impossible to draw, from any such sources, the evidence 
winch the case demands, ; but, till it is produced, if I am told that 
the Constitution of the United States provides that slaves, escaping 
from a State where they were held as such, and coming into this 
State, shall be given up, on demand of the owner ; and if I am 
asked, ' Is it not so?' I reply, In my judgement, it is not. But — 
and this brings us to the other of the two questions just pro- 
posed ; viz : 

Secondly, What if it is so ? To this I answer : — Even if it 
is so — if it is clearly proved that this was the intention and un- 
derstanding of the framers of the Constitution, then, I say that 
that provision, being against natural right, and, consequently, in 
derogation of a higher law, and requiring me to do what God for- 
bids me to do, is of no binding force whatever, but is utterly void. 
This particular covenant, — for the Constitution of the United 
States is a covenant, or, rather, a number of covenants, entered 
into by the People of the United States, each with all the rest, — 
must come under the law of all human covenants, compacts or 
agreements, in this, that it is of no binding force, if it is contrary 
to the laws of God. The consideration that a Constitution is the 
act of a Convention, and an ordinary law, an act of a Congress ; 
that the former is called the fundamental law, lying at the founda- 
tion of the government, or of the Union, does not alter its moral 
character. There is a government that hath still deeper founda- 
tions — foundations, that under-lie those of any human govern- 
ment, and on which, alone, the soul of man can build up for itself 
an ' everlasting habitation.' Says Sir William Blackstone — 



27 

1 Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the 
laws of his Creator, for he is entirely a dependent being. A being 
independent of any other, has no rule to pursue, but such as he 
prescribes to himself; but a state of dependence will inevitably 
oblige the inferior to take the will of him, on whom he depends, as 
the rule of his conduct : not, indeed, in every particular, but in all 
those points wherein his dependence consists. This principle, 
therefore, has more or less extent and effect, in proportion as the 
superiority of the one, and the dependence of the other, is greater 
or less, absolute or limited. And, consequently, as man depends 
absolutely upon his Maker for every thing, it is necessary that he 
should, in all points, conform to his Maker's will. This will of his 
Maker is called " the law of nature." ' And ' This law of nature, 
being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is, of 
course, superior in obligation to any other. It is binding all over 
the globe, in all countries, and at all times. No human laws are 
of any validity, if contrary to this.'* Lord Chief Justice Hobart, 
too, holds that ' even an act of Parliament, made against natural 
justice, is void in itself, for the laws of nature are immutable, and 
are leges legum, the laws to whose authority all other other laws 
must give place.'t ' No human laws,' says Blackstone, again,$ 
' should be suffered to contradict these. To instance in the case 
of murder : — this is expressly forbidden by the divine, and de- 
monstrably by the natural law: and from these prohibitions 
arises the true unlawfulness of this crime. Those human laws, 
that annex a punishment to it, do not at all increase its moral guilt, 
or superadd any fresh obligation in foro conscientiae to abstain 
from its perpetration. Nay, if any human law should allow or 
enjoin us to commit it, we are bound to transgress that human law, 
or else ice must offend both the natural and the divine.' 

* Blackstone's Commentaries, I. 39, 41. % Vol. I. p. I ■ 

t Blackstone's Coram. I. p 41, Christian's Note.— (Xote 4.) 



This is as trite as Truth herself. Nothing on earth can shake 
this position. Now, then, let us reason from it. ' If any human 
law should allow or enjoin murder, we are bound to transgress 
that law.' But the Constitution of the United States is a human 
law. Should it enjoin murder, which is, the taking away of 
a man's hfe, in violation of a natural or divine law, we are bound 
to transgress that Constitution. Now, the claimant, in this case, 
says, and for the sake of the argument, I admit, that the Consti- 
tution enjoins me to aid him in kidnapping, which is, the taking 
away of another man's liberty, in violation of a natural or divine 
law. Then I am bound to transgress that Constitution. — All 
writers on Natural Law admit our Declaration of Independence 
and many of our State Constitutions expressly declare, that a 
man's natural right to his liberty is as clear as his natural right to 
his life. Which is the greater blessing, I am not called upon, in 
this case, to decide. But I know, that thousands of the noblest 
of our revolutionary fathers and patriots judged, that life without 
liberty was not worth the holding : and especially do the words 
of one of the most eloquent of Virginia's own sons continually 
ring in my ear. ' Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be 
purchased at the price of chains and slavery ? Forbid it, Almighty 
God ! I know not what course others may take, but as for me, 
give me liberty, or give me death ! ' 

If, then, the clause of the Constitution that is appealed to, by 
the claimant in this case, does enjoin it upon me, as a judge, to 
deliver up the man before me to Virginia's ' chains and slavery,' 
I feel myself bound by a higher law, — by the authority of the 
Judge of all judges, — to declare that clause of the Constitution 
of no binding force before this tribunal, and the judgement oi 
this court is, that the prisoner be discharged. 



29 

Before leaving the bench, upon which I have supposed myself 
to be sitting, I must dispose of a few objections that may be 
Urged, in opposition to the judgement just pronounced. 

1. I am reminded that, as a Judge, I have sworn to support the 
Constitution of the United States. 

I reply, first, I swore to support the Constitution according to 
my understanding of it : — not according to yours, or any other 
man's. And I have already given it as my understanding of the 
clause in question, that it never was intended by the framers of 
the instrument to provide for the delivering up of a fugitive 
slave ; but, that it was intended to apply to fugitives from justice ; 
that is, the just claims or demands of citizens in another State. 
And, thus understood, my present judgement does support the 
Constitution. 

And I answer, secondly, — admitting that the present claim- 
ant's construction of the clause in question is the true one ; — 
nay, admitting that I so understood it when I took my oath, and 
that I so understand it now; — it only follows that my oath is, 
void. It was taken in sin, and, if performed, would be so in a 
still greater sin. 

"T is a great sin to swear unto a sin ; 
But greater sin to keep a sinful oath.'* 

2. I am told that this part of the Constitution of the United 
States was a compromise between the friends of freedom at the 
North, and those of slavery, at the South. 

Answer, 1. Admit it. It was a sinful compromise ; a compro- 
mise that the delegates, in neither interest, had any right to make ; 
a compromise, on the part of the North, of moral principle ; a 
compromise void, for its immorality, even as to the contracting 
parties themselves ; and, if possible, still more void as to all who 
shall come after them. It was just the compromise that Judas 

* Pericles, Prince of Tyre, Act V. Scen^ S. 



30 

toade with the chief priests. Each party was anxious to get 
something that he had not got. The chief priests would gladly 
keep their money, and get then* victim too : but then victim they 
must have at all events. Judas would gladly hold fast his integ' 
rity ; but, at any rate, the chief priests' money he must have. 
The one party gave up then money to get then victim ; the other 
gave up his integrity and his Saviour, to get the money. This 
Was the compromise, in the one case. In the other case, — ad- 
mitting the compromise, — both parties were desirous of the 
Union. The South had her slavery, the North her integrity. But 
these could not co-exist, if the Union was effected. There 
was a natural incompatibility between them. One or the other 
must be laid upon the altar of the Union. Which should be 
given up as the sacrifice ? Certainly not our slavery, said the 
South — let the Union go rather than that. Well, then, said the 
North, rather than not get the Union, let our integrity go. That 
Was the compromise in the other case : — if it is a fact, which I 
do not admit, except for sake of the argument, but on the 
contrary, 

2. And in the second place, I deny. For, it is essential to a 
compromise, between two parties, that something should be 
given up by each. What was given up by the South ? On the 
construction contended for, she got the Union — a thing much 
more essential to her than to the North. She held fast to her 
slavery, and secured a new guaranty to it, by binding the freemen 
of the North to be her slave -catchers and whippers-in, for all 
future time ! 

3. Once more, it is said that this stipulation or provision in 
favor of southern slavery was a sine qua non> a condition without 
which the slave States would never have come into the Union 

Answer 1st. Then let them have stayed out. 

2nd. How is that known ? — How can it be known ? Who is 



31 

it that has such a knowledge of the possible result of the delib- 
erations of such minds as were in the Convention of the fraraers 
of the Constitution of the United States, — deliberations held 
under the pressing exigencies of that period, — as to enable him 
to say what result could, and what could not, have been reached, 
without a sacrifice of moral principle? But, even if were so : — 
if, instead of a Convention of patriots, it had been a Conven- 
tion of prophets, that framed the Constitution, and those old 
seers had distinctly seen that, without a provision that should 
make the north-men slave-hunters for the South, the present Union 
would never have been formed : — could a worse destiny have 
awaited the disunited colonies, under the British crown, than 
to have, within the life of man, from that moment, as many 
human beings as then breathed American air, bound in the chains 
of absolute slavery; and thrice as many more, so much more 
degraded and debased, than the slaves themselves, as to consent 
to be converted into iron, and worked up into tools, — vises and 
hammers — to fasten on those chains ? A ruinous price docs lie 
pay for his civil liberty, icho, to purchase it, gives himself up the 
bond-slave at once of sinners and of sin ! 

My friends and brethren, I have supposed myself an incum- 
bent, for a time, of the judgement-seat, before which a fellow 
man is to be brought, whose condition as a freeman or a slave is 
to be fixed by my decision. I have given you my judgement, 
and stand now before you, not a magistrate, but a minister of 
Jesus Christ ; feeling the responsibleness that lies on me as such, 
to you, to my profession, to my country and to God. I have 
spoken, and will yet speak, freely, on this subject at this crisis : 
for I feel as the great statesman of our own city felt, more than 
twenty years ago, when standing by Plymouth rock, and, speaking 
of the veiy work which is now going on in the temples of jus- 



32 

tice and the prisons of this city — namely, the catching, chaining 
and dooming to hopeless slavery of our fellow men — he said, — 
\ I hear the sound of the hammer. I see the smoke of the 
furnaces, where manacles and fetters are forged for human limbs. 
I see the visages of those who, by stealth, and at midnight, labor 
in this work of hell, foul and dark as may become the artificers 
of such instruments of misery and torture. * * * I would in- 
voke those who fill the seats of justice, and all who minister at 
the altar, that they administer the wholesome and necessary 
severity of the law. I invoke the ministers of religion, that they 
proclaim its denunciation of these crimes, and add its solemn 
sanctions to the authority of human laws. If the pulpit be 
silent, whenever or wherever there may be a sinner, bloody with 
this guilt, within the hearing of its voice, that pulpit is false to its 
trust.'* I know that this was spoken with special reference to 
the foreign slave trade. But I know, too, that, foreign or domes- 
tic, sin is sin. I know that God's laws take, within their compass, 
all latitudes and all longitudes, that they sweep over all seas 
and all lands alike ; regarding the enslaving of a man with no 
more favor in Boston than in Congo; and pronouncing the 
panders of this sin no less guilty, when sitting on a judgement- 
seat, than when standing on a slaver's deck. I know that a man 
cannot take himself out of the hand of these laws, by swearing 
that they shall not hold him ; — that he cannot shake them off, by 
his oath that he mil; and, however it may appear to the moral 
vision of other men, to mine, the morality that requires and 
compels me to deliver up a fellow man to chains and torture — to 
hopeless slavery, if not to death, because others have covenanted 
for me that I shall do so, and because of my own oath that I will 
keep that covenant ; — is, essentially, the morality of a Judas, 
who would deliver up the Son of Man to be scourged and cruci- 

* Daniel Webster's Oration at Plymouth, 1S20. 



33 

fled, because he had covenanted to do so; — the morality of a 
Herod, who, ./or his oath's sake, would murder a prophet of God ; — 
the morality of the female fiend of the great English dramatist, 
who says of herself — 

' I have given suck, and know 

How tender 't is, to love the babe that milks me : 
I would, while it was smiling in my face, 
Have pluck'd my nipple from its boneless gums, 
And dash'd the brains out, had I so but sworn, 
As you have done to this.'* 

I am aware that this is not popular doctrine. I know that 
the current of public sentiment, in the great thoroughfares of 
business, and along the channels of commerce, sets strongly 
against it. I know that in the eyes, of the many — yea, and of 
the mighty — the Constitution of these United States is su- 
preme ; — that it over-rides God's laws, and that it must stand, 
though they he trodden under foot. But it is the object of this 
discourse to lift up God's law, to make^it honorable in my hear- 
ers' eyes, and to make even the highest of human ordinances to 
do it homage. Though State may league with State, and mil- 
lions covenant with millions more, to sustain a wrong, they cannot 
hold it up. Though hand join in hand, the wicked shall not go 
unpunished. Even yet, ' Righteousness exalteth a nation, but 
sin is a reproach to any people.' 

I would not, indeed, reproach the noble band of patriots, who 
framed the Constitution of the United States. I would not wil- 
lingly believe that they deserve the reproach that is cast upon 
them by those who hold, that, into the great charter of our coun- 
try's freedom they covertly inwrought the charter of perpetual 
slavery, for themselves and their posterity. But, even if they 
did, — if the proof that they did were ever so overwhelming, — 

* Macbeth, Act I. Scene vii. 



34 

though I may feel myself afflicted on being compelled to ad- 
mit it — 

' And, sad as angels, at a good man's sin, 
Weep to record, and blush to give it in ! ' 

yet, even then, that charter shall have no binding force upon my 
soul. If, by both the letter and the spirit of that covenant, they 
meant to bind me to do the slaveholder's work, and minister to 
his sin, I cannot forget the word of the Lord, which he spake by 
his servant Moses : ' Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the 
servant which is escaped from Ins master unto thee.'* Nor can I 
forget my Master's words : ' He loveth father or mother more than 
me, is not worthy of me ;' and I shall regard their covenant, in 
that particular, as utterly null and void. If, on my heavenward 
journey, I see even the Constitution of the United States stand- 
ing in my path, like the visionary ladder of the patriarch, it shall 
not hinder — it shall help me on my way; for I will mount up- 
ward by treading it under my feet. 

My brethren, much as we may venerate our fathers, we must 
venerate still more the rights of man, and his Maker's laws. 
Though we may reverently cherish their memory, and jealously 
guard their fame, we must not forget that there is One, whose 
authority is liigher than theirs ; and, if it be true that, in the laws 
which they made for us, they have required us to do any tiling, 
so incompatible with the commads of the Most High, that we 
cannot obey them both, I most seriously ask you, Which shall we 
obey — our dead fathers? or, our Living God? 

* Deuteronomy xsiii. 15. 



NOTES. 



Note 1. Pasre 19. 



I may, I trust, be allowed to throw into a note here, the remarks 
of Michaelis, in his Commentanj on the Laws of Moses, (Art. 
144, 145,) touching vows in general, of the kind now under con- 
sideration ; and the vow of Jephtha, in particular. 

' Suppose a person to make a vow to God, which involved the 
commission of a crime; — that he will commit adultery, for in- 
stance, or be guilty of regicide, of which the Polish history fur- 
nishes an example : — is it to be imagined that the Deity would 
accept such a vow? None but a miscreant or a blasphemer 

IT* Jv i UQ t0 „ Say S °- Illdeed ' the Vel T ^ea were horrible.' 
* * .But a still grosser abuse of the Cherem, (or vow to the 
Lord,) proceedmg from imitation of foreign and heathenish prac- 
tices, we shall probably find in the history of Jephtha. This 
brave barbarian, an illegitimate child, and without inheritance, 
who had, from his youth, been a robber, and was now, from bein- 
the leader of banditti, transformed into a general, had vowed if 
he conquered the Ammonites, to make a burnt offering to the 
Lord of whatever should first come out of his house to meet 
aim, on his return. His vow was so absurd, and, at the same 
fame, so contrary to the Mosaic law, that it could not possibly 
™?« 25 T e f pted °f . God > or obligatory. For, what if a dog or 
anasshad first met him? Could he have offered it ? By the 

rtlff 8 ' n ° lmd f an b / ast could be brou § ht to ^ itar; 
™IZ S T\ T S '' hU \ ° f 1 q uadr "P^s only oxen, sheep, and 
Mnlt . Wha lf a T n had &st met hira ? Human sacrifices 
™ S had u mos * stnctl y Prohibited, and described as the abom- 
dnven f,°nn, W C " laamtes : ** Je P»tha, who had early been 
driven fiom his home, and had grown up to manhood among 



36 

banditti, in the land of Tob, might not know much of the laws 
of Moses, and probably was but a bad Lawyer, and just as bad 
a Theologian. The neighboring nations used human sacrifices. 
The Canaanites, especially, are, by Moses and other sacred wri- 
ters, often accused of this abominable idolatry ; of which we 
find still more in the Greek and Latin authors ; and possibly, 
therefore, Jephtha, when he made the vow, may have thought of 
being met not merely by a beast, but by a slave, whom, of course, 
he would sacrifice after the heathen* fashion. His words are, 
" If thou givest the Ammonites into my hands, whatever first 
cometh forth from my house to meet me, on my happy return 
from the Ammonites, shall be the Lord's, and I will bring it to 
him as a burnt offering." Most unfortunately, his only daughter 
first came out to congratulate him : and the ignorant barbarian, 
though extremely affected at the sight, was yet so superstitious, 
and so unacquainted with the religion and laws of his country, 
as to suppose he could not recall his vow.' 



Note 2. Page 21. 

Matthew xv. 4 — 6. Mark vii. 9—13. For the sake of pre- 
senting the iniquity of this practice more distinctly before the 
mind of the ordinary reader than it is presented by the words of 
the Evangelists, I subjoin the commentary of Michaelis upon 
their language. 

' It seems that it was then not uncommon for an undutifal and 
degenerate son, who wanted to be rid of the burden of support- 
ing his parents, and, in his wrath, to turn them adrift upon the 
wide world, to say to his father and mother Korban, or Be that 
Korban (consecrated) which I should appropriate to thy support; 
that is, Every thing ivhcreicith I might ever aid or serve thee, and, 
of course, every thing, which I ought to devote to thy relief, in the 
days of helpless old age, I here vow unto God. A most abominable 
vow, indeed ! and one which God would, unquestionably, as little 
approve or accept as he would, a vow to commit adultery or sod- 
omy. And yet, some of the Pharisees pronounced on such oaths 

*We sacrifice slaves, even judicially, after a Christian fashion. When shall we cease to be 
bound by precedents from these old barbarians ! 



37 

this strange decision, that they were absolutely obligatory ;* and 
that the son, who uttered such words, was bound to abstain from 
contributing, in the smallest article, to the behoof of his parents ; 
because every thing that should have been appropriated, had 
become consecrated to God, and could no longer be applied to 
their use, without sacrilege and a breach of his vow. But on 
this exposition, Christ not only remarked, that it abrogated the 
fifth commandment, but he likewise added, as a counter doctrine, 
that Moses, their own legislator, had expressly declared, that the 
man who cursed father or mother, deserved to die. Now it is im- 
possible for a man to curse his parents more effectually than by 
a vow like this, when he interprets it with such rigor, as to pre- 
clude him from doing any thing in future for their benefit. It is 
not imprecating upon them a curse, in the common style of curses ; 
which but evaporate into air, because neither the devil nor the 
lightning is wont to be so obsequious as to obey our wishes, every 
time we call upon the one to take, or the other to strike dead, onr 
adversaries : — but it is fulfilling the curse, and making it, to all 
intents and purposes, effectual.' — Mich. Comm. on the Laws of 
Moses, Art. 293. 



Note 3. Page 24. 

A clause in the Constitution, providing that a fugitive slave 
shall be given up, on claim of the party to whom his service or 
labor may be due, certainly does not prove that, in any particular 
case, service is due from a slave, to the party claiming him. 
That, if proved at all, must be proved aliunde ; and, as we have 
seen, in the discourse, that nothing can be due from a slave to his 
holder, it follows that nothing can be proved to be due. 

Again, if the pursuer and claimant, here, appeals to the laws 
of Virginia, and the Court here should acknowledge their author- 
ity in Massachusetts, in order to meet the exigencies of the 
present case ; nay, should the claimant prove slavery to exist in 

*Just as the official oaths of our magistrates, to support the Constitution of the United 
States, with the understanding that it requires the giving up of a fugitive slave to bondage, 
torture, and even death, are pretty generally understood, in our day, to be obligatory. O, 
when shall our righteousness exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees ! 



38 

Virginia, and to be recognized by her laws ; — should he go still 
farther, and prove that, under those laws, the man claimed was a 
slave, and his slave ; that is not enough to show that service or 
labor is due from his slave, to himself as owner. By natural 
law it is >jiot due. If due at all, even in Virginia, it must be 
made so by a declaratory act of the Virginia Legislature. Let 
that act be produced. 



Note 4. Page 27. 

I am aware that Mr. Christian differs in opinion, on this point, 
with Mr. Justice Blackstone, and Chief Justice Hobart. He 
conceives ' that, in no case whatever, can a Judge oppose Ins 
opinion and authority to the clear will and declaration of the 
Legislature. His province is, to interpret and obey the mandates 
of the supreme power of the State. And, if an act of Parlia- 
ment, if we could suppose such a case, should, like the edict of 
Herod, command all the children under a certain age to be slain, 
the Judge ought to resign his office, rather than be auxiliary in 
its execution ; but it could only be declared void by the same 
legislative power by which it was ordained.' But this cannot be 
true doctrine, especially in this country, where no one doubts the 
authority of the bench to declare an act of the Legislature void, 
for that it is against the Constitution. This, as I understand, 
was lately done by the Supreme Court of the United States, in 
regard to a part of a law of Congress, touching the very clause 
of the Constitution now under consideration. That part of an 
act of Congress was declared void, because in conflict with the 
Constitution of the United States, — a higher law. On the same 
principle, the clause of the Constitution now in question, if it 
must be so construed as to demand the delivering up of a fugitive 
slave, must be declared void, because it is clearly in conflict with 
a higher law, the Constitution of Man, and the law of the 
Supreme Power of the Universe. 



39 

Besides, see to what a consequence the doctrine of Mr. Chris- 
tian would bring us. If ' it is the province of a Judge to interpret 
and obey the supreme power of the State,' and that supreme 
power be corrupt, the Judge changes his function, at once ; and 
from a judicial, becomes a ministerial officer. Instead of declar- 
ing what the law is, he must do its bidding. Instead of sitting 
in judgement upon legislative acts, he becomes a tool in the hand 
of the legislative power; and his function is performed when he 
has done the legislative will ; — the boasted independence of the 
Judiciary is all a sham ; and there is no barrier between the 
despot and the subject, whether the despot be king One, or Icing 
Million. To be sure, Mr. Christian says that, in case the legis- 
lative power should enact the Herod, then, ' the Judge ought to 
resign his office, rather than be auxiliary to its execution.' Yes, — 
and give place to one that would be auxiliary ! Who doubts that 
a second James, on the throne, could find a second Jeffries, for 
the bench ? 



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